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COURT-AWARDED "REASONABLE" FEES:
FORCING A SEGREGATED PUBLIC INTEREST
BAR?
I. Introduction
A fundamental premise of the legal system in the United States
is that courts' which shape and interpret governmental or social
policy should be freely accessible to those citizens who may be af-
fected by such policies.' Unfortunately, there are no guarantees that
a party anxious to present a grievance in the judicial forum can
obtain adequate legal counsel. Nevertheless, because of its substan-
tive and procedural complexities, our legal system demands compe-
tent legal representation. Economic reality being what it is, that
segment of society unable to absorb the cost of counsel fees will
often go unrepresented and valid claims with potentially crucial
social impact will go unheard.'
While in the past ten years the public interest' law movement has
increased the availability of legal services to those whose economic
1. While both state and federal courts allow the awarding of attorneys' fees in limited
cases, discussion of fees awards practices in state courts is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For a general discussion of state court fees awards, see Note, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees
and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974). See also 6 MooRE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 54.77[21, at 1712 (1974).
2. "The democratic promise of 'Equal Justice Under Law' necessarily requires equal
access to legal institutions. In this Nation, perhaps more than in any other, access to legal
institutions presupposes access to lawyers." Hearings on the Effect of Legal Fees on the
Adequacy of Representation Before the Senate Subcommittee on Representation of Citizens'
Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 798 (1973) (statement
of J. Kline, Esq.) [hereinafter cited as Legal Fees]. See generally Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971); Cahn and Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The tblic
Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970).
3. Legal Fees, supra note 2, at 798.
4. See generally Nussbaum, Attorneys Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 301, 305-06 (1973).
5. COUNCIL Folt PUBuC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALEs or JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBuC
INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA (1976) [hereinafter cited as COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW]
defines public interest law in the following manner:
Public interest law is the name that has been given to efforts to provide legal represen-
tation to interests that historically have been unrepresented and underrepresented in
the legal process. These include not only the poor and disadvantaged but ordinary
citizens who, because they cannot afford lawyers to represent them, have lacked access
to the courts, administrative agencies, and other legal forums in which basic policy
decisions affecting their interests are made.
Id. at 3.
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station would ordinarily preclude the retention of legal counsel, a
crucial requirement for the continuation of such programs is the
involvement of the private bar.' Such involvement, however, will
depend in large measure on the economic incentives provided the
private sector to accept such public interest cases.' To date, the
greatest incentive has been the awarding of attorneys' fees by the
courts.8
This Comment will demonstrate that the manner in which the
courts have inconsistently applied standards for setting fees levels
is adversely affecting the viability of such awards as a device for
funding litigation.' As a result, the ability and desire of private sole
practitioners and firms to accept public interest cases might be
severely diminished."0 The ultimate result is that a valuable seg-
ment of the legal community is lost to the public interest move-
ment.
Part II will briefly sketch the current means by which attorneys
may obtain court-awarded fees.
6. Such involvement may be both financial as well as active. Private public interest
activity may be generated by an increase in pro bono publico involvement, or by the providing
of economic incentives, such as court-awarded fees, for the private bar to accept public
interest cases. Id. at 298-306
Direct monetary contribution from the private bar seems more likely than an extension of
pro bono activity. See pt. VI infra. See generally Erlanger, Young Lawyers and Work in the
Public Interest, 1978 AM. B. FOUNDATION RzSEARCH J. 83 (1978).
7. Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970) points out:
As a source of support for public interest activity, private law firms offer an enormous
pool of lawyer time and talent. At first glance, only the reluctance of private lawyers
to accept less income than they might otherwise make seems to prevent full harness-
ment of their resources to the needs of the underrepresented.
Id. at 1107. This Comment assumes that the profit motive of lawyers has not changed drasti-
cally since the date of the cited excerpt.
8. Court-awarded fees create a situation whereby a party may recover the value of its
attorneys' services as part of its recovery. Some statutes allow the recovery directly to the
attorney. See, e.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act Amendments
of 1972 § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 928 (1976) (where employer opposes an employee's workers' compen-
sation claim, attorneys' fees may be taxed against the employer where the employee initiates
an administrative proceeding to force payment). Thus, private counsel can accept a case from
a client otherwise unable to pay his fees on the basis of a prospective court-awarded fee. This
practice may be in jeopardy however. See pt. IV infra for a discussion of why court-awarded
fees might be in disfavor as a means of funding otherwise unaffordable litigation.
9. See pts. III & IV infra. The scope of this Comment is a discussion of assessing the level
of court-awarded fees in the context of litigation. Many of the principles governing awards
in such cases would be applicable on any occasion where a court is called upon to award fees
to a party.
10. See pt. IV infra.
COURT AWARDED REASONABLE FEES
Part III will survey the varied interpretations and applications of
"reasonable" fees by the courts by reviewing the criteria used to
establish the amount of an award and offering some explanations
why many of the criteria used might adversely affect the level of an
attorney's fee award.
Part IV will investigate the possible effect of fees awards on the
availability of private counsel. This section will be viewed from the
standpoint of an attorney faced with an award which represents a
reduction in his customary hourly rate and demands production of
highly detailed records in order to justify his claim for such an
award.
Part V will trace the effect of attorneys' fees awards on the ability
of public interest firms and non-profit law centers to continue ac-
cepting cases where the fees awarded are not at marketplace levels.
Part VI will attempt to predict whether the pro bono publico
efforts of the private bar are sufficient to undertake the share of
public interest litigation being affected by the growing inability of
private counsel to accept such cases on a prospective fees-award
basis.
II. Equitable and Statutory Bases for Attorneys' Fees Awards
Customarily, the fee arrangements between attorney and client
are a matter of private contract." In the context of litigation, the
strictly followed "American rule" is that each litigant is responsible
for the cost of his own attorney.'2 While numerous commentators
have questioned the vitality of such a practice,'3 the Supreme Court
has reaffirmed its devotion to the rule. In Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company v. Wilderness Society,'4 the Court reviewed the long-
standing American rule, concluding that absent statutory authority
to the contrary private litigants are individually burdened with at-
torneys' fees.'" The Court has recently reaffirmed this position.' The
11. See generally 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES §§ 1.1, 2.1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
SPEISER]; ABA COMM. ON ECONOMICS OF LAW PRAcrcE, THE LAWYER'S HANDBOOK 305 (1962).
12. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978); Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Indus. Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
13. See, e.g., McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing
Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. Rav. 761 (1972); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost
of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. Rav. 75 (1963). See also 1 SPEISER, supra note 11, at § 12.8.
14. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
15. Id. at 269. The American rule is not followed in other common law jurisdictions. For
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unfortunate effect of such a system is that potential plaintiffs with-
out the funds necessary to seek out and retain legal representation
have often been forced to forego the judicial forum.
However, the American rule does have its exceptions. In limited
cases, the courts will allow fee-shifting, 7 on a discretionary basis,'8
where a party engages in "common fund"' 9 or "common benefit"29
litigation. Also, where a party engages in a frivolous, vexatious, or
"bad faith" action," or willfully disobeys a court order,22 attorneys'
fees may be assessed against him. 3 While the common-fund and
example, the rule in England is that the prevailing party in litigation is entitled to attorneys'
fees as a matter of right. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929); C. MCCORMICK, LAW
oF DAMAGES 234-36 (1935); 1 SPEISER, supra note 11, at § 12.7 & note 71.
The Alyeska decision eliminated the "private attorney general" exception to the American
rule. 421 U.S. at 269. The exception allowed a plaintiff who brought an action which vindi-
cated important statutory rights of all citizens the costs of his attorneys' fees, under the
theory that an individual should not be privately taxed with the burden of essentially public
litigation. The elimination of the exception has had a profound effect on the financing of
public interest litigation, and hence the ability of private parties to enforce statutory rights.
See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 5, at 314.
16. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
17. "Fee-shifting" is a commonly used phrase to describe the process whereby the courts
determine whether and to what extent persons other than a client should be required to
assume the costs of the client's attorney.
18. Courts are free, in their discretion, to award fees under the common fund, common
benefit, and obdurate behavior exceptions. See notes 19, 20 & 21 infra. The power to award
fees under these exceptions stems from the equitable jurisdiction of the courts. Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975).
19. The "common fund" exception recognizes the duty of the beneficiaries of a fund
recovered by the plaintiff to pay their proportionate share of the fees to which plaintiffs'
attorneys are entitled. The exception was noted with approval in Alyeska. 421 U.S. at 257.
The common fund exception first appeared in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
20. "Common benefit" litigation closely resembles the common fund exception. The prin-
ciples are essentially the same; a plaintiff who confers a benefit on a class of beneficiaries
may charge a proportionate amount of his attorneys' fees to the other beneficiaries. See Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), where plaintiff brought a stockholder's deriva-
tive action against defendant corporation. Though no monetary recovery was obtained, the
Court charged plaintiff's attorneys' fees to the corporation, citing the corporation as the real
beneficiary of the action. Id. at 392, 396-97. See also Altman v. Central of Georgia Ry., 580
F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
21. Where the losing party acts solely for oppressive reasons, the court may award fees.
F. D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Ind. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Vaughan
v. Atkinson,- 369 U.S. 527 (1972).
22. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923). See also FED. R. Civ.
P. 37(b)(2)(E), which allows a court to assess fees for the failure of a party to comply with a
court order compelling discovery.
23. For a complete discussion of the equitable bases upon which a fees award can be
obtained, see Berger, Court-Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is Reasonable?, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 281, 295-303 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
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common-benefit exceptions provide a plaintiff, otherwise unable to
retain counsel, with an opportunity to lure attorneys with the prom-
ise of fees, the obdurate behavior exception does not. 4
Perhaps the single most important development in the area of the
availability of legal representation has been the passage or amend-
ment of federal statutes which specifically provide for court-
awarded attorneys' fees,25 either on a discretionary 2 or mandatory
basis. 7 Provisions of most of the statutes allow an award of
"reasonable attorneys' fees", 8 either to a "prevailing ' 29  or
"substantially prevailing" 30 plaintiff. Others merely specify a pre-
vailing party.31
The problem which becomes readily apparent is on what basis a
court is to assess the quantum of a "reasonable" fee.3 2 Since the
24. Where the plaintiff knows that the litigation will generate a common fund, or benefit
a class of beneficiaries, his attorney has a reasonable expectancy of receiving fees from the
fund or from the beneficiaries as a class. Where the basis of an award is the other party's
behavior, the fees award is essentially punitive, and cannot be anticiapted prior to trial.
Hence, it is of no utility as a method of funding litigation.
25. For a list of federal statutes authorizing the award of fees, see Berger, supra note 22,
at 303 n.104. See, e.g., notes 26-30 infra.
26. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. V 1975), as
amended by Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-284, § 10(c), 90 Stat. 503 (1976); Privacy Act of 1974, § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g)(2)(B) (1976).
27. See, e. g., Truth-in-Lending Act § 408(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976); Civil Rights Act
of 1964 § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) provides that "in any
action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall
be liable for costs the same as a private person." Id. While the language of the statute appears
to make the award discretionary, the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause as mandating
an award to a successful plaintiff absent exceptional circumstances. Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
28. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 § 2, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988
(1976). "[Tlhe court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Id. See also Civil Rights Act of 1964,
supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. V 1975), as
amended by Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-284, § 10(c), 90 Stat. 503 (1976).
30. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act Amendments § l(b)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(E)
(1976); Privacy Act of 1974 § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B) (1976).
31. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1976).
32. Legislative histories of the statutes provide little guidance to the courts. The funda-
mental purpose of the fees awards provisions is to provide private parties the opportunity to
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ability of otherwise unrepresentable clients to obtain adequate
counsel usually depends on the level of a court-imposed fee award,
the standards employed by the courts in the calculus of the award
are crucial. Fees which fail to reflect marketplace economics3 or
which demand that counsel maintain hyper-accurate time and fees
records31 will effectively discourage acceptance of cases by attor-
neys when payment for such work is at the discretion of the courts.
Strangely enough, the Supreme Court has never reviewed an award
of attorneys' fees with the aim of announcing criteria to be used in
setting a reasonable fees level.3 5 The result has been a variety of tests
being applied by lower courts. 31
III. Court Interpretation of "Reasonable" Fees
In 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc.37 announced twelve factors to be
considered in setting the level of an attorneys' fees award:
enforce statutory rights. Private enforcement of such rights is essential to the protection of
the public. Such was the announced purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976 § 2, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1976). The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee read
as follows:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce
the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be
able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws
are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover
what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
S. Rep. No'. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5908, 5910.
The Committee held that appropriate standards for setting the level of fees awarded should
be governed by Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), S.
REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. at 6, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5913.
But see pt. I infra.
One statute specifically addressing- the issue of what factors are to be included in the
calculus of a fees award level is the Consumer Product Safety Comm'n Improvements Act of
.1976 § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2059(e)(4) (1976)."The actual time expended by the attorney in
providing advice and other legal services" and reasonable expenses as may be incurred by
the attorney, are to be recovered at "the rate prevailing for the provision of similar services
with respect to actions brought in the court which is awarding such fee." Id. It is suggested
that such factors are succeptible to the same problems as noted in pts. III and IV infra.
33. See pt. IV(A) infra.
34. See pt. IV(B) infra.
35. While the Court has dealt with the entitlement of a party to a fees award, it has never
dealt with the issue of what factors are to be applied in calculating the amount of an award.
See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412 (1978); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
36. See pt. III infra.
37. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
1979] COURT AWARDED REASONABLE FEES 405
(1) the time and labor required
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
(3) the skill requisite to perform'the legal service properly
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance
of the case
(5) the customary fee
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances
(8) the amount involved or the results obtained
(9), the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney
(10) the undesirability of the case
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client
(12) fees awards in similar cases38
The court pointed out that the statute which authorized the fees
award "was not passed for the benefit of the attorneys", nor was it
designed to "make the prevailing counsel rich."3 Since the Johnson
decision in 1974, and after a period of uncertainty and conflict as
to what criteria to employ in determining the level of a fees award,
most of the circuits have now rallied around the Johnson test."
38. Id. at 717-19. The factors are also those promulgated by the ABA CODE OF PROF. RESP.
DR 2-106.
39. 488 F.2d at 719. See also Barnett v. Pritzker, 73 F.R.D. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
40. See, e.g., Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beekman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.
1978); Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d
487 (9th Cir. 1978); Finney v. Hutto, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), af('d, 98 S.Ct. 2565 (1978);
First Colonial Corp. of America v. American Benefit Life Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.
1977); EEOC v. Bailey Co., Inc., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d
1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 3146 (1978); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503
F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see Copeland v. Marshall, No. 77-1351 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30,
1978); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); Detroit V. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093
(2d Cir. 1977); Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc., v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
The Johnson factors were also cited with approval in the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. See note 32 supra.
The recent Copeland decision established a new formula in the District of Columbia circuit
for computing fees awards levels. The formula reimburses the attorney for his costs, and
allows for a "controllable" profit. Such a test will force the attorney to defend his costs, profits
and methods of handling each case. It might also lead to a situation where the small firm or
sole practitioner will receive a smaller recovery than a large commercial firm, due to the
discrepancy in profit structures. Nonetheless, Copeland seems to be, at least for now, confined
to application in cases in which the government is a defendant, as the action was brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against the U.S. Department of Labor. For a
general discussion of Copeland, see The Nat'l L.J., March 19, 1979, at 15, col. 3. Public
interest groups seeking en banc review of the decision were recently dealt a serious blow when
the court refused to accept five of six amicus curiae briefs filed by various civil rights groups
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While the expected result of the recognition of the Johnson cri-
teria by the majority of courts would be some degree of uniformity
in fees awards, the results have been less than consistent. While
Johnson establishes guidelines to be employed by trial courts in
setting fees, it provides no guidance as to the relative importance
of each of the twelve factors." Hence, lower courts have mechani-
cally applied the test factors, achieving widely divergent results in
very similar cases.4" The initial problem is that lower courts are free
to stress one factor at the expense of another. The result is an in-
finite variety of applications of the factors first announced in
Johnson."
A second confusion resulting from Johnson is that several of the
factors are either conflicting or duplicative. One commentator has
noted that the "time and labor involved" must necessarily reflect
the "novelty and difficulty of the questions" in each case.44 Assess-
ing both factors individually might result inoa double recovery."
Application of Johnson factor number four, the preclusion of other
employment, directly conflicts with factor ten, the undesirability
of the case. The fact that an attorney would accept a case, at the
expense of taking others, would seem to indicate that the case is
"desirable". The skill reflected in Johnson factor number three
will of necessity overlap the experience and ability of the attorney
reflected in factor nine. Additionally, a court accounting for the
fixed or contingent nature of the fee has the option to reward the
and government agencies, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP, and
the EEOC. Only the EEOC brief was accepted. The brief is two pages long, and contains only
a short statement on the probable effects of the decision on fees levels and the availability of
counsel. The Nat'l L.J., April 9, 1979, at 2, col. 3.
41. See Berger, supra note 23, at 286.
42. Compare NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978) with Willett v. Chester
Water Authority, 447 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Both cases were brought under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1976). The court in NAACP
set a $100 per hour fee, while the Willett court set the fee at $50 per hour for a senior attorney
and $30 for a junior associate.
43. See, e.g., Exner v. FBI, 443 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Cal. 1978). The court stressed the
time spent, novelty and complexity of issues, level of attorney skill, attorney's customary fee,
experience, reputation, and ability of counsel, and awards in similar cases. In Phillips v.
Moore, 441 F. Supp. 833 (W.D.N.C. 1978), the court stressed the factors of Exner, minus the
awards in similar cases factor, and added the results obtained factor, whether the fee was
fixed or contingent, the undesirability of the case, aid the cost of operating a law practice.
44. See Berger, supra note 23, at 286 n.26.
45. A court which calculated a recovery on the basis of both the time spent on the issues
and the novelty of the questions would necessarily allow a bonus for the novelty while already
having reflected the bonus in the amount of time the attorney would be allowed to recover
for.
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attorney for undertaking litigation which entails some risk, yet
another court might reduce the fee on the basis that counsel was
willing at the onset of litigation to accept no fee at all. In either
event, such a factoring of the contingent nature of the fee is in
derogation of the customary fees factor of number five where it
exceeds the attorney's contingent fee arrangement with the client,
or where it fails to reflect counsel's normal expectation of reward
for accepting the case on a contingent basis. Factoring such con-
siderations into a fees award would unfairly reflect a compromise
reached by the courts between conflicting criteria.
The most significant problem inherent in the Johnson test is in
requiring the trial court to assess fees on the basis of the results
achieved or the recovery obtained. Clearly, such a requirement con-
flicts with the court's duty to recognize the time and labor in-
volved." Theoretically, where an attorney invests a great deal of
time and energy, wins at trial, yet still loses a single nondispositive
issue, his fee, if awarded at all, could reflect the value of his time,
discounted by the courts' discretionary deduction for the loss of the
issue. In effect, assessment of the results obtained creates a situa-
tion where a court may make a post hoc decision that the action
should not have been brought, or that an argument should not have
been advanced.'7
Such a decision offends the notion that the judicial forum should
be freely available to all parties. Nonetheless, application of the
results-obtained factor by the courts has been inconsistent; some
courts have accorded it a high degree of importance, while others
have ignored the results entirely."
Perhaps the most troubling inconsistencies resulting from judicial
application of the Johnson criteria involve the widely divergent
46. See Berger, supra note 23, at 287-89.
47. But see National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 1171
(D.C. Cir. 1978), where the court held such post hoc determinations to be impermissible.
48. Note that Johnson factor eight allows the court either to assess the amount recovered
or the results obtained. The Second Circuit in Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d
Cir. 1977), pointed out that judges should not be unduly influenced by the monetary size of
a judgment or settlement. 560 F.2d at 1099.
Lower courts are divided. Compare Phillips v. Moore, 441 F. Supp. 833 (W.D.N.C. 1977)
(results obtained first factor applied by court) with Perkins v. New Orleans Athletic Club,
429 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. La. 1976) (importance and novelty of issues, time expended, and
quality of briefs submitted most significant factors). See note 43 supra and accompanying
text.
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sums awarded." An attorney litigating a private antitrust case
stands almost invariably to receive as much as three times the fee
an attorney will receive for litigating a civil rights case.50 Assuming
both spend the same amount of time on each trial and the skills of
counsel are comparative, the rationale for the difference in fees
awarded must concern the relative difficulty of each case. Yet, the
antitrust litigation might turn on well-travelled laws, while the civil
rights case may be unique. Still, the clear trend is toward rewarding
commercial litigation more handsomely than public interest litiga-
tion."
Another difficulty is that while most appellate courts require the
trial judge to base a fees award on record evidence,52 most courts of
appeal are unwilling to disturb a trial court's award if the trial judge
mechanically recites he or she has computed the award with refer-
ence to Johnson. Since review of an award is based on an abuse of
discretion standard,5" the "Johnson clause" inserted by many of the
lower courts is sufficient to ward off review. 4 The end result is that
many judges are allowed to enter conclusory judgments as to the
level of fees granted, and few of the awards have been vacated. 5
While the Johnson criteria have been afforded some degree of
consideration by most courts, many others have added and sub-
tracted criteria to be used in computing the level of fees awards."
In Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Stan-
49. See, e.g., Guajardo v. Estelle, 432 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D. Tex. 1977), modified, 580 F.2d
748 (5th Cir. 1978) (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act- $127,565 award ); Johnson v.
O'Brien, 445 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (award of $2850); Perkins v. New Orleans Athletic
Club, 429 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. La. 1976)($10,000 awarded).
50. See Berger, supra note 23, at 293; COUNcIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 5, at
321.
51. Courts have often employed a "public interest discount" rationale, citing the pro bono
character of the cases and the obligation of practitioners to accept cases where the client is
unable to pay. See, e.g., National Council of Community Mental Health Centers v. Wein-
berger, 387 F. Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1974); COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 5, at
321.
52. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974),
where the court remanded, requiring the trial court to furnish a record reflecting the consider-
ations leading to the award. Id. at 720.
53. Id.; Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 540
F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir. 1976); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 97 (5th
Cir. 1972).
54. See, e.g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). "The district court properly
bases its award on an examination of the factors in Johnson . . . . We find no error in its
award of fees." Id. at 756.
55. See Berger, supra note 23, at 286.
56. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
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dard Sanitary Corp.,57 the Third Circuit affirmed the application of
a "lodestar" concept.58 The trial court computes this lodestar by
multiplying the hours submitted by the attorney by the court's
finding of what a reasonable hourly rate would be."9 The hours sub-
mitted are subject to review by the court;60 the court may also re-
duce the hours for such variables as the manner in which the attor-
ney spent his time, the quality of his work, and the contingent
nature of success in the action."' Thus, the award becomes almost
entirely discretionary. In Hughes v. Repko," the Third Circuit
modified its Lindy standard to give the district courts the power to
determine not only the number of hours the attorney devoted to the
case, but also whether it was "reasonably necessary" to spend that
number of hours in order to perform the services. 3 The burden of
persuading the court of the necessity of the time spent rests with the
attorney. 4 Unlike the Johnson test, Lindy does not reduce the
award for the simplicity of the issues involved, preferring to reflect
such a determination in the time-spent factor. 5
The Second Circuit has decided that its lodestar test is to be
calculated on the basis of multiplying the number of hours spent by
the attorney by the hourly rate normally charged for similar work
by attorneys of like skill in the area. In City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp.,7 the court added that this lodestar may then be adjusted by
less objective factors such as the "risk of litigation," complexity of
the issues, and the skills of the attorney.
In applying either the Johnson, Lindy or Grinnell standards, sev-
eral courts have supplemented the award by mechanically adding
a bonus percentage to the awarded fee. 9 While some judges have
57. 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
58. Id. at 108, citing Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973).
59. 540 F.2d at 108 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator
and Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973).
60. 540 F.2d at 109.
61. Id. at 112-13.
62. 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978).
63. Id. at 487.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977).
67. 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977).
68. Id. at 1098.
69. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Bldrs. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 540
19791
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recognized the need for providing incentives for counsel to accept
public-interest cases,"0 few if any courts coincide in their level of
"bonus" to be awarded. In Lindy the court approved a bonus of
100%, citing the risk involved in the case and the quality of work
performed by the attorneys.7' In Kiser v. Miller,"7 the court added a
premium of 10% in order to induce counsel to represent the public
and enforce the law.73 Apart from the discrepancy in motives for
such incentives, awarding a bonus under the Lindy rationale would
duplicate several of the factors enunciated in Johnson. 74 Apparently,
while some factors are mandatory in one circuit, their application
is discretionary in another."
In the final analysis, the divergent methods of calculating the
level of fees awards and the disparity of each of the factors employed
has led to the situation where counsel is, at the onset of litigation,
unsure not only of whether a fee will be awarded at all, but of the
amount of the award as well. While each circuit has announced a
standard to be applied in calculating a fees level, the endless varia-
bles at work in any exercise of discretion by the trial court is impos-
sible to predict. The end result is a standard which is incapable of
prior calculation by the attorney. Such a consideration must enter
into counsel's decision to accept the case.
F.2d 102, 113 (3rd Cir. 1976); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 687-88 (N.D. Cal.
1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978),
rehearing denied, 99 S. Ct. 231 (1978).
70. See, e.g., Richey, Attorney's Fees: A Two-Pronged Problem, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1975,
at 59, reprinted in Hearings on the Awarding of Attorneys' Fees Before the House Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 422 (1975).
71. 540 F.2d 102, 115-16 (3rd Cir. 1976).
72. 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973), modified on other grounds sub nom. Kiser v. Huge,
517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
73. 364 F. Supp. at 1318.
74. The 100% bonus affirmed in Lindy was on the basis of the risk of the litigation and
the quality of the work of the attorneys. Such factors reflect the considerations made manda-
tory by Johnson in factors six and nine. See Berger, supra note 23, at 291. In National Ass'n
of Regional Medical Programs Inc. v. Weinberger, 396 F. Supp. 842, 850-51 (D.D.C. 1975),
the court awarded a 100% bonus based on factors already reflected in the amount of time
spent and the normal billing rate of the attorneys. Thus, the bonus duplicated the normal
award.
75. Under Lindy, factors accounted for in determining the eligibility for a bonus are
discretionary with the court. The same factors are of required application by the Johnson
court. See note 74 supra.
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IV. The Effect of "Reasonable" Fees on Private Practitioners:
The Availability of Counsel
The practice of law, like any other profession, is motivated by
economic self-interest. Undeniably, the attorney who fails to gener-
ate sufficient fee-producing work will not be in practice long. Re-
flected in an attorney's fees level are his operational costs, costs of
maintaining expertise in his field, and a reasonable profit margin. 6
In the context of public interest cases, an attorney who accepts such
a case relying only on the promise of a fees award at the conclusion
of litigation runs a substantial risk of disappointment.', The court
may refuse to award fees, or the award it hands down may be woe-
fully low. Where the latter occurs, and the award fails to cover the
attorney's costs, the ultimate burden of acceptance of the public
interest case will be borne by the remainder of the attorney's fee-
paying clients.' The potential for conflict of interest is high. 9 Thus,
where court-awarded fees fail to reflect the attorney's worth in the
marketplace, most private lawyers will entertain second thoughts
about accepting public interest cases without some definite fee ar-
rangement in advance. In addition, where a fees award substantially
exceeds the market rate for an attorney's services, the ultimate loser
is the opposing party, and the results might be unnecessarily puni-
tive.0 The uncertainty with which most courts approach setting
fees-awards levels might be reflected in the unwillingness of counsel
to accept cases contingent on such awards.
A. Fee Reductions
Particularly in the application of the Johnson, Lindy, and
Grinnell criteria, a court's first investigation will be in testing the
validity and necessity of counsel-submitted hours."' It is clear that
76. Obviously, these factors are not exclusive. See generally 1 SPEISER, supra note 11, at
§ 1:35.
77. See pt. III supra.
78. See Berlin, Roisman, & Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 675, 687-
88 (1970).
79. Id. at 681.
80. Since the legislative purpose of most fees award statutes is to increase the availability
of counsel to those otherwise unable to retain an attorney, see note 32 supra, a situation where
a court awards an excessive fee for the purpose of punishing the opposing party would be just
the type of "judicial legislating" proscribed by the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975).
81. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977); Lindy Bros.
Bldrs., Inc. v. Am. Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 108 (3rd Cir. 1976);
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the norms by which such hours are to be tested are personal to the
trial judge, 2 derived from hindsight in the particular case and his
own past experiences. For many courts, the time sheets submitted
by the attorney are not conclusive, 83 and for the most part, the time
submitted is reduced by the court in setting the level of the fee 4.8
Where the court reduces the attorney's compensable hours, the
amount of the award is comensurately reduced."3
While assessment of compensable hours is discretionary with the
court, the second step in assessing any lodestar is the computation
of a "reasonable" hourly rate. 6 The methods by which this rate is
computed diverge.87 Where the hourly rate is set as a community
standard,8 the rate may not properly reflect the personal skills of
the attorney or his dedication to the case. Where the community
rate is high for such cases, incompetent counsel are rewarded.89
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974).
82. See, e.g., Marr v. Rife, 545 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976). "[Tihe judge may make an
independent determination of the proper expenditure of time that is reasonably necessary for
the preparation and presentation of the particular case." Id. at 556. See also text accompany-
ing notes 59-63 supra.
83. See, e.g., Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd,
578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1978)(court required precise time records, including purposes for which
the time was spent. Court reduced the time submitted by 10%, citing no reason); Lockheed
Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missile and Space Co., 406 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Cal.
1976)(required time records and identification of purposes for which the hours were spent.
Court accepted a claim of 1004.5 hours, then added 20 hours).
84. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 407-12 (D. Colo. 1977); Parker
v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1067 (D.D.C. 1976); Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1318
(D.D.C. 1973), modified on other grounds sub nom. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
85. Where the calculation of the fee is based on a "lodestar," see notes 58 & 59 supra and
accompanying text, reduction in the number of compensable hours will reduce the ultimate
award.
86. See note 59 supra.
87. Some circuits employ the attorney's customary hourly rate for similar cases; others
use a community standard. See note 66 supra. The majority of courts leave the hourly rate
to the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978)
($100 per hour based on experience and reputation of the attorneys, and the novelty of the
case); Morehead v. Lewis, 432 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. I1. 1977) (court will not accept attorney's
own accounting for the value of his services, but will exercise its own knowledge and experi-
ence); Goff v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (hourly rate set at
$50, based on what a "reasonably prudent local attorney proceeding to dispose of the case
by preliminary motion" might have charged); Lund v. Affleck, 442 F. Supp. 1109 (D.R.I.
1977)($60 hourly rate).
88. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977).
89. For a contrary statement see notes 38, 61 & 68 supra and accompanying text. The
courts, under the Johnson, Grinnell, and Lindy tests, are allowed to reduce the hourly rate,
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Conceivably, an attorney handling a public interest case which has
national effects might receive only a relatively low local rate. Courts
have not enunciated how to deal with litigation which is unique, and
has no local antecedent. In any case, where the amount of a fee is
set by the court's discretion, most of the cases disagree as to the
proper fee level.' 0
Most cases hold that the hourly rate is reduced depending upon
how the attorney spent his time. While courtroom time nets a higher
rate, time spent on the telephone or on administrative tasks rele-
vant to the case is compensated at lower levels." The courts usually
do not explain how this often necessary time expenditure is any less
an effective representation of the client. Courts will also strain to
reduce the hourly rate for less experienced attorne s.s In one case,
the court set a $50 per hour rate for one attorney and a $35 per hour
rate for an attorney who, though having as much experience as his
senior associate in the subject matter of the litigation, was paid $15
per hour less because he had been admitted to the bar only two years
earlier. Since neither of the two had ever tried a Title VII case
before, arguably both should have received the same hourly rate.
The court admitted its view to be wholly subjective. 3
In many cases where the hourly rate is established by community
standard, the courts might still impose a maximum ceiling for the
rate. 4 Few courts cite reasons for doing so. One court went so far as
to conclude that only in extreme circumstances would the hourly
rate exceed two-thirds of the average billing rate of attorneys doing
for example, where the case is not difficult, or increase the rate in order to reward counsel
for outstanding work. The problem with adjusting the rate upward in order to reward counsel
is that the opposing party or an unrepresented class member is forced to pay the reward.
90. See, e.g., Willett v. Chester Water Auth., 447 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Pea. 1978)($50 per
hour for senior attorney, $30 for associate); Hartmann v. Gaffney, 446 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn.
1977)($60 per hour); Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D.N.Y. 1977)($40 per hour);
Adams v. Hempstead Heath Co., 426 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)($20-$30 per hour);
Schmidt v. Schubert, 433 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Wis. 1977)($45 per hour); Latham v. Chandler,
406 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Miss. 1976)($20-$40 per hour); Spero v. Abbott Laboratories, 396 F.
Supp. 312 (N.D. Ill. 1975)($5 per hour); See also Berger, supra note 23, at 290.
91. See, e.g., Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd,
578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1978); McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of Educ., 424 F. Supp. 1382
(N.D. Miss. 1976); Jordan v. Fusari, 422 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Conn. 1975).
92. See, e.g., cases cited at note 90 supra.
93. Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missile and Space Co., 406 F.
Supp. 828, 834 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
94. See, e.g., Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y 1977), aff'd,
578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1978)($100 per hour maximum).
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similar work."
Few of the courts consider the length of the litigation, or the fact
that counsel fees have been held in abeyance pending conclusion of
the case in setting the level of fees." Thus, the attorney is forced to
expend his time and absorb his overhead without benefit of income
from the case. Still further, few courts recognize that the length of
the litigation creates a situation whereby inflation reduces the
award. 7
Not only is the length of the litigation itself a significant problem,
but in many cases courts will not allow attorneys' fees for the pur-
pose of litigating the issue of the amount of the award." At times,
argument over that issue alone can be both protracted and expen-
sive."
The ultimate conclusion that may be drawn from the disparate
awards of counsel fees is that an attorney, upon accepting a case
where his only expectation of fees depends on a court award, can
anticipate that the award will probably not reflect the market rate
for his services. The obvious effect of this trend is that a variety of
private practitioners will be precluded from accepting public inter-
est cases, or will simply shun such work. 00
B. Compelled Scrutiny of Attorneys' Records
A second factor capable of motivating attorneys away from public
95. Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977), cited with approval in
White v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
96. See, e.g., cases cited at note 40 supra.
97. See cases cited at note 40 supra. But see Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v.
Lockheed Missile and Space Co., 406 F. Supp. at 834. The court did consider the postpone-
ment of the fees award and the effect of inflation on the amount in assessing the fee awarded.
98. This is particularly true where the fees are granted under the common fund or com-
mon benefit exceptions to the American rule. See pt. II supra. The rationale for this withhold-
ing is that the litigation of fees levels does not benefit the class, and hence class members
should not be made to pay for the extra labor. See, e.g., Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585
F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Co., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977); but see
Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977).
99. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976). Following settlement of the private antitrust action, the attor-
neys applied to the district court for a fees award. The court granted the fees award, an
appeal was taken by the other party, and the court of appeals vacated and remanded. The
district court entered a new award, and a second appeal was taken. The court of appeals
once again vacated and remanded. Id. at 102.
100. See Court Ruling On Fees Worries Public-Interest Lawyers, New York Times, Nov.
14, 1978, at A25, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Court Ruling].
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interest cases is the fact that courts will base their conclusions as
to reasonable expenditures of time and hourly rates on the records
maintained by counsel. In most cases, this requires the maintenance
of a timekeeping system capable of judicial scrutiny.'0' Some courts
have required precise records, including the purposes for which the
attorney's time was spent.' 2 Others accept an affidavit of counsel
as verification of time spent. 03 Nonetheless, in the event the attor-
ney fails to keep sufficient records, the doubts as to time will be
resolved against him-often an expensive proposition. Other courts
freely reconstruct time records. 04
Regardless of how many hours the court accepts as a valid ex-
penditure of time, the figure may be reduced by the court, in its
discretion, where it determines the time was spent unnecessarily. 05
In one case, the trial court employed its own estimate of the time
required to analyze, research and draft documents on a specific
point of law, reducing a documented 90.75 hour request to a final
award of thirty hours.'0
In terms of assessing an hourly rate, those courts employing a
system whereby counsel's customary fees for the same or similar
services are used to determine the hourly rate,'10 the court may
compel production of pertinent financial records, financial state-
ments, and fee structures.0 The effect of compelled disclosure of
such documents might be a reluctance of many practitioners and
commercial firms to accept public interest cases. This is especially
101. See, e.g., King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977).
102. See, e.g., In re Meade Land & Dev. Co., 527 F.2d 280, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1975).
103. See, e.g., Guajardo v. Estelle, 432 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D. Tex. 1977), modified on other
grounds, 580 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978).
104. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
105. See notes 62 & 63 supra and accompanying text.
106. Boe v. Colello, 447 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
107. See generally Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1247 (3d Cir. 1977); Lindy Bros.
Bldrs. Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1977).
108. See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 F.R.D. 662 (W.D.N.C. 1978)
which compelled disclosure of billing rates and fees charged by counsel, including fees nego-
tiated with opposing parties. The information required also included names of attorneys,
number of hours and the billing rates for each lawyer and paralegal employee. The court also
required a statement whether counsel intended in the future to adjust their hourly rates
upward because of their success in the action.
For a general discussion of methods of maintaining time records and financial statements
in anticipation of requests for fees awards, see Belton, Feeing the Unfee'd Lawyer: Attorneys'
Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, 5 LTGATION, No. 2, at 32 (Winter 1979).
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true where such cases represent only a small percentage of the firm's
caseload, yet would require production of public and non-public
interest case fee information.0 9 Disclosure of such information
would make it a matter of record for review by the appellate
courts,"' and could arguably make such information susceptible of
discovery by opposing parties."' In essence, such information would
be confidential in name only.
C. Judicial Discretion in Assessing Attorney Performance
Perhaps the most distasteful problem for an attorney is to have
the quality of his work judged subjectively by a court. The Johnson
factors which require courts to set fees levels with reference to the
skill of the attorney compel a court to consider counsel's perform-
ance throughout the litigation."' Furthermore, such findings be-
come a matter of record for review."' Essentially the court is di-
rected to assess retrospectively not only the competence of the attor-
ney in general, but the effectiveness of his advocacy and the tactical
decisions he has made. Theoretically, an error which would nor-
mally have little significance might be underscored by a court which
takes exceptional notice of such misfires. The amount of the fee
would be thereby reduced.
A conflict between the court and counsel might result under a
provision allowing court appraisal of attorney performance. Under
Canon Seven of the Code of Professional Responsibility," 4 the duty
of the lawyer is to represent his client zealously. Clearly, a court
applying the vision of hindsight might view an action of counsel as
extraneous, while in fact the attorney viewed his action as attempt-
ing to provide for every contingency. Essentially, the attorney's zeal
109. See Court Ruling, supra note 100.
110. Since trial courts are required to base their awards on record evidence, time and
financial records submitted by counsel presumably become a part of the trial record. Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1974).
111. Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 F.R.D. 662 (W.D.N.C. 1978), discussed
at note 108 supra, was an order compelling discovery.
112. Johnson factors three and nine require the trial court to assess whether the attorney
has performed with the necessary skill, as well as judge his ability overall. See note 38 supra
and accompanying text. See also Berger, supra note 23 at 294.
113. See note 52 supra. The court in Johnson clearly stated that the lower court must
elucidate the factors which "contributed to the decision and upon which it was based." 488
F.2d at 717. If the trial court bases its award on the ability of counsel, per Johnson factor
number nine, it must so state. Id.
114. ABA CODE OF PaOF. REsp. EC 7-1.
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would be penalized. The court could interpret attorney thorough-
ness as redundancy or as an unnecessary expenditure of time. The
ethical duty to press a client's interests conscientiously may be met
with a lower price, at the court's discretion."' Thus, the impression
an advocate makes before a court cannot be discounted as a signifi-
cant factor in the assessment of fees."' Obviously, such an uneasy
situation will tend to direct counsel away from cases which entail
just such a subjective investigation."' No attorney should be forced
to choose between his client and the value of his services.
V. Reduced Fees Awards and the Non-Profit Public
Interest Law Centers
The heart of the world of public interest law is the non-profit law
center. I's The economic basis upon which most of these centers oper-
ate is varied. Typically, the operating capital is provided by private
charitable foundations, contributions from the private bar and the
general public, citizens groups, government programs, reduced
client-paid fees, and court-awarded attorneys' fees.'19 A somewhat
smaller segment of public interest activity is assumed by the privaie
public-interest law firm, which relies almost entirely on reduced
client-paid fees and court-awarded fees for its funding.'20 Lastly, the
private commercial bar contributes a portion of public interest rep-
resentation, either gratuitously or at significantly reduced rates as
pro bono publico activity, or at normal rates assumed by the client
or accepted with the promise of court-awarded fees. '' As noted
earlier, the inconsistency of courts in awarding fees threatens the
willingness of private practitioners to assume cases with a fees
award as the sole means of payment.'22 Similarly, inconsistencies in
115. See Berger, supra note 23, at 294.
116. Id.
117. See F.D. Rich v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974). The Court rejected an
abandonment of the American rule due to a concern that the earnings of attorneys would
come "from the flow of the pen of the judge." 417 U.S. at 129. The potential for abuse in
such a system of judicial discretion is high, as is the potential loss of public confidence in
the legal system, and of lawyer confidence in the courts.
118. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw, supra note 5, at 79.
119. B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER, & N. KoMFsAR, PUBuC INTEREST LAw 534, (1978) (herein-
after cited as*WEISBROD).
120. Berlin, Roisman, & Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 675, 680
(1970); COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw, supra note 5, at 138.
121. CoUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw, supra note 5, at 300.
122. See pt. IV supra.
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awarding fees affects the economic stability of private public-
interest firms as well."3 Many such firms are on precarious financial
ground now,'"' and a situation whereby market fees are not awarded
does not aid this situation.
In contrast, the non-profit law center has a sufficient economic
base such that lower-than-market fees will not lead to its ultimate
financial demise.' 5 While it is true the non-profit center is in need
of continued funding, the absence of higher court-awarded fees is
only one factor contributing to its economic distress. With a broader
economic base than private firms, the non-profit center can survive
with reduced court-awarded fees.'26 Nevertheless, both private pub-
lic interest activities and public non-profit centers would benefit
from consistently increased court awards of attorneys' fees.
A second advantage the non-profit center has which reduces its
expenses, vis-a-vis the private sector, is its ability to qualify for tax-
exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code.2 7 A non-profit
center qualifies for tax-exempt status where it derives no more than
one-half its total costs from court or agency awarded fees, is con-
trolled by a board "representative of the public interest", and is not
involved in any lobbying efforts or attempts to influence legisla-
tion. I2s Where the center qualifies, the effect on funding can be
substantial. Court-awarded fees become a substantial item of tax-
free income, and can be supplemented by the other resources men-
tioned earlier.'2 ' Clearly, no private firm can qualify for such treat-
ment.1's
123. Since the economic bases upon which the private public interest firms operate are
essentially those of reduced client-paid fees and court awards, the inability to predict the level
of a court-awarded fee will have much the same effect on the public interest firm as it does
on the commercial firm. See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
124. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 5, at 137.
125. See note 119 supra.
126. This, of course, assumes that the other funding methods increase. For a discussion
of the future prospect for funding, see COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 5, at
219-328. See also Halpern, Public Interest Law: Its Past and Future, 58 JUD. 119, 125 (Oct.
1974) [hereinafter cited as Halpern].
127. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
128. FORD FOUNDATION & ABA SPEC. COMM. ON PUB. INTEREST PRACTICE, PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: FVE YEARS LATER 33 (1976).
129. See note 119 supra.
130. Since private firms rely heavily on court-awarded fees, they would not qualify for tax-
exempt status where their budgets reflect over 50% of income from fees. Acceptance of fees
from clients, even though low, would be an automatic disqualification as well. See note 128
supra and accompanying text.
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The end result of this comparison is that the non-profit public
interest center, because of its broader funding base, can absorb
decreased court-awarded attorneys' fees.'3t Since the primary reli-
ance of the private bar is on marketplace fees awards in public
interest litigation, an award which fails to reflect such levels seri-
ously jeopardizes the ability of private counsel to accept such cases,
especially where the award is not sufficient to defray expenses or
provide the attorney with his customary salary.
VI. Pro Bono Services: Taking up the Slack?
Most commentators agree that, assuming the private bar can be
lured into public interest practice by court-awarded fees, the need
for lawyers to assume public interest causes will still not be fully
met.'3 2 Growth in the number of attorneys willing to accept such
cases must therefore come from extensions of pro bono activities.
However, such an outlook reflects more desire than reality.' As a
1975 study indicates,'34 the private bar's contribution to public in-
terest practice comes mainly from sole practitioners, includes little
or no litigation, and benefits small groups of individuals rather than
large segments of society. 35 Estimates are that over 60% of private
attorneys spend less than 5% of their annual billable hours in public
interest or pro bono work.3 ' Most of the pro bono work done for
individuals is most frequently in the areas of matrimonial or crimi-
nal law. 3 Few lawyers contribute work in the areas of welfare, em-
ployment, poverty, social security, mental health, or health law-
areas which normally are considered public interest.'38 The conclu-
sion drawn by the study is that the overwhelming majority of pro
131. As one commentator noted: "At present, the funding of only Legal Services appears
secure, and one price for this security has been curtailment of the types of cases the program
can take." Erlanger, Young Lawyers and Work in the Public Interest, 1978 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RES. J. 83, 104 (1978).
132. "The number of firms that could at best be supported by all the sources and methods
projected in this paper still falls far short of the number of practicing lawyers required to meet
the needs that the [public interest] work of the past five years has helped to reveal .... "
FORD FOUNDATION & ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW:
FIVE YEARS LATER 38 (1976).
133. See Halpern, supra note 126, at 126.
134. Handler, Hollingsworth, Erlanger, & Ladinsky, The Public Interest Activities of
Private Practice Lawyers, 61 A.B.A.J. 1388 (1975).
135. Id. at 1394.
136. Id. at 1389.
137. Id. at 1390.
138. Id.
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bono work is not contributed to aid groups or individuals seeking to
change the status quo or enforce public rights.'39
Assuming this trend continues, the hope that the pro bono activi-
ties of the private bar can assume some of the public interest work-
load created by the unwillingness of private counsel to accept cases
on a potential fees-award basis is wishful thinking.'0 A significant
increase in contributed time to public interest causes is unlikely.",
VII. Conclusion
Since both the continued growth of public interest law firms and
increased involvement of the private commercial bar are essential
to the adequate representation of all segments of society,' the
courts should seek to construct a system whereby attorneys' fees
reflect a fair marketplace"' fee with a minimum of inquisition into
the fee structures and time records of attorneys. Until now, the
courts have employed a system whereby little if any consideration
has been given to the overhead an attorney must absorb in the
conduct of a private practice,"' or the fact that most litigation in
which an award of fees is granted is both lengthy and non-generative
of income during the term of trial."' Counsel might wait up to three
years for the litigation to conclude, and subsequently spend a year
arguing the amount of the fees award.
The situation being created is one in which the private commer-
cial bar, having chosen to represent a client who otherwise could not
pay for legal services, is faced with the prospects of reduced fees,
court investigation of confidential records, and judicial assessment
of counsel's trial and pre-trial performance. It can only be expected
such cases will be looked upon distastefully by most private practi-
tioners. The result must be that private public interest firms and
non-profit centers will be left to absorb these cases, if accepted at
all. Given the turbulent financial situation of many public interest
139. Id. at 1391.
140. Halpern, supra note 126, at 126.
141. See generally F. MAKS, K. LwINo, & B. FoMNSKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY (1972) [hereinafter cited as MARKS].
142. See Halpern, supra note 126, at 125. "Abandonment of public interest practice...
would force the profession to turn its back on even the pretence that an adversary process is
basic to justice . I..." d  See also 65 A.B.A.J. 332 (1979).
143. Most commentators agree that the fees should be set at marketplace levels. See, e.g.,
COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw, supra note 5, at 321.
144. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 97 & 99 supra and accompanying text.
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firms, such a result wuld be intolerable. The private bar must be
given the incentives to undertake public interest representation. 4 ,
A higher level of court-awarded fees would provide this incentive,
while adding significant funds to the non-profit centers and public
interest firms. Such an investment would be reflected in the ability
of larger segments of the public to obtain legal representation. The
unfortunate effect of the status quo is that the courts are driving the
private bar away from the public interest forum, and placing a
heavy burden on the public interest bar to solicit and obtain in-
creased funding in order to represent an increased number of clients.
Paul L. Robert
146. "Economic inducement, of course, would be the most palatable way for the bar. It
is also a way which would cause the least dislocation to the prevailing system." MAStKS, supra
note 141, at 284.

